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THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY:
FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
Laurel A. Rigertas*
There is a point at which an institution attempting to provide protection to
a public that seems clearly, over a long period, not to want it, and perhaps
not to need it—there is a point when that institution must wonder whether
it is providing protection or imposing its will. It must wonder whether it
is helping or hurting the public.1

INTRODUCTION
The regulation of the legal profession is failing in its consumer protection
role because the manner in which the quality of legal services is currently
regulated causes insurmountable problems with access to legal services.
Current regulations restrict activities that constitute the practice of law to
licensed attorneys. This restriction is justified, in large part, based on the
assumption that the public cannot make informed decisions about who is
qualified to provide legal advice and, therefore, the government must make
that determination.2 Even if this assumption is correct, restricting the
practice of law to those who have completed a juris doctor has constrained
the market options so that many consumers have no access to legal services
at all.3 This also has consumer protection implications.
The practical effect is that a large number of consumers—who are
presumed incapable of assessing the quality of legal services when making
purchasing decisions—are for all practical purposes presumed capable of
becoming educated and informed enough about the law to handle their legal
matters pro se.4 These two presumptions are irreconcilable. The first
presumption justifies limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys if we,

* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., University of
Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank the participants of this Colloquium, The Legal
Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014), for their
feedback and comments. I would also like to thank Laurel Terry and Marc Falkoff for their
comments on earlier drafts. Lastly, I would like to thank my research assistants Zachary
Clark and Alex Van Maren.
1. In re Op. No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344,
1360–61 (N.J. 1995).
2. See infra Part II.B.1.
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. This Article uses the word “consumers” instead of “clients” because many
individuals seek the services of a lawyer but are never able to obtain them due to cost
constraints, so they never become “clients.” The word “client” presupposes an attorneyclient relationship.
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as a society, are financially committed to providing everyone with access to
a licensed attorney. We are not.5 Therefore, the regulators of legal services
need to address the pragmatic problem raised by the second presumption.
Many people who cannot afford a licensed attorney need some help, and
many of them could probably pay something reasonable for it, but those
options are not available.
Making lawyers’ services more affordable and accessible has been a
declared goal of the legal profession for decades.6 The profession’s
attempts to meet this goal have included efforts to increase funding for legal
aid, campaigns to increase pro bono work, and revisions to rules to allow
the unbundling of legal services.7 Recently, the profession has also been
examining the rising cost of legal education and student debt as they relate
to the cost of legal services.8 Despite these efforts, however, study after
study has shown an increase in unmet legal needs.9
Most innovations in the delivery of legal services are occurring in the
marketplace by companies trying to reach a segment of consumers that the
legal profession has not been able to serve successfully at an affordable
cost.10 There is now a long history of companies trying to fill this void
starting with Nolo Press in the 1960s and evolving into the technologically
savvy LegalZoom.11 Such innovations are largely happening in spite of the
regulations on the practice of law. Those regulations are still steeped in
rules that restrict the exploration of many innovations.12
Regulations—particularly those that prohibit some consumer options—
should balance the management of consumer risks with the impact on
innovation and access. Both have consumer protection implications. The
current balance has tipped too far in the direction of managing risks to the
point of stifling innovation. It is time for the main regulators of the legal
profession—the state supreme courts—to revisit the scope of the legal
profession’s exclusive monopoly. As a practical matter, this means
5. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
6. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 209, 215 (1990).
7. Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND
CIVIL JUSTICE 11 (1996) (recommending an expansion of unbundled legal services to
increase access to legal services).
8. See, e.g., Judith Welch Wegner, Response: More Complicated Than We Think, 59 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 623, 639–40 (2010).
9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 13–18.
10. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S.
Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 4 (2012); see also John S. Dzienkowski, The
Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2995, 3000–01 (2014) (discussing innovations in the delivery of services to
corporate clients).
11. Jon M. Garon, Legal Education in Disruption: The Headwinds and Tailwinds of
Technology, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1174–77 (2013) (describing the historical background
and rise of self-help legal services such as Nolo Press, LegalZoom, and FindLaw).
12. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV.
1281, 1286 (2013).

2014]

FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS

2685

assessing deregulation of some legal services as well as assessing
alternative ways to deliver regulated services. Because of unmet demand,
much of this is happening irrespective of the rules governing the practice of
law.13 But if the state supreme courts want to remain relevant to the
regulation of the practice of law, they need to take more of a leadership role
in these areas.
I. WHAT JUSTIFIES GOVERNMENT REGULATION?
When the government decides to regulate in any area, two questions
should be addressed: why does the government need to regulate this area
and how should the government regulate this area? This Part briefly
explores some theories of when regulation is appropriate, particularly when
the chosen regulatory method is to ban certain options from the
marketplace. This Part then examines several reasons to regulate the legal
profession and ban nonlawyers from providing legal services.
A. Consumer Protection and the Public Interest—Generally
Government regulations can have a variety of justifications,14 but a key
justification for the legal profession’s monopoly is to protect consumers.15
This is not the only justification, but it is one of the more frequently cited
ones.16 Thus, it is worth taking a moment to ask what “consumer
protection” usually means. One definition states, “The consumer protection
laws are intended to ensure that consumers can select effectively from
among those options with their critical faculties unimpaired by such
violations as deception or the withholding of material information.”17

13. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What
Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067 (2014) (discussing changes that are taking place in the
market for legal services despite few changes to the regulations on the practice of law).
14. Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2688–92 (2012) (surveying different regulatory theories).
15. Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17
(1979) (“Occupational restrictions, in the form of state licensing laws and so-called ‘ethical’
restraints imposed by professional associations, have traditionally been justified on the
assumption that they protect consumers.”).
16. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 113 S.W.3d 105, 121 (Ky.
2003) (“The rationale for [unauthorized practice of law] restrictions is that ‘limiting the
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services
by unqualified persons.’” (quoting KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(5.5) cmt. 2)); Dressel v.
Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Mich. 2003) (“At the core of this movement and of all
other attempts to regulate the practice was an interest in protecting the public from the
danger of unskilled persons practicing law.”); Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law v. O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 213 (Mont. 2006) (“[T]he primary
reason for prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law is to protect the public from being
advised and represented by unqualified persons not subject to professional regulation.”). For
a more expansive list of possible regulatory objectives, see Terry et al., supra note 14, at
2734 (proposing a list of regulatory objectives for the legal profession).
17. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44, 44–45 (1998).
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Stated another way, “effective consumer choice requires two things:
options in the marketplace and the ability to select freely among them.”18
The law has long supported the idea that consumers generally have the
ability to purchase all sorts of products and services that may or may not
suit their needs and may or may not deliver the desired results.19 Just think
of all the advertisements claiming that exercise DVDs will produce sixpack abs in just weeks, creams will make wrinkles fade, vitamin
supplements will make joint pain disappear, drinks will make energy soar,
insurance you need will be at the price you name, Botox will make eyes
more youthful, acupuncture will increase fertility, and so on. In the end,
maybe they will, maybe they will not. But in our free market—in the
absence of conduct such as fraud—consumers can usually make these
purchasing decisions and then live with the consequences. In the private
ordering of affairs, parties can also allocate risks, and individuals may
implicitly or expressly assume the risk of adverse outcomes, even when the
adverse outcome is as catastrophic as paralysis or death.20 Such allocations
are generally enforced unless they violate public policy.21
Consumer protection laws focus predominately on making sure that
consumers have accurate and complete information about products and
services so that they can make informed decisions when deciding what to
buy or whom to hire.22 Such laws and regulations include those that
prohibit false or misleading advertising23 and those that require additional
information, such as disclaimers, warnings, or adequate instructions.24
Licenses and certifications can also provide consumers with additional
information when they make purchasing decisions.25 Consumers can be
protected by preventative measures, such as requiring certain labeling on
drugs at the time of marketing,26 as well as remedial measures, such as

18. Id. at 46.
19. Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 685–86 (W. Va. 2005)
(describing the principle of freedom to contract and its public policy limits).
20. See, e.g., Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1062–63 (2d Cir. 1992) (remanding for a
new trial because the jury was not instructed to consider whether the decedent expressly
assumed the risk of nonconventional cancer treatment that failed to cure her cancer); Crace
v. Kent State Univ., 924 N.E.2d 906, 909–12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the doctrine
of primary assumption of risk barred a paralyzed cheerleader’s claim against the university).
21. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446–47 (Cal. 1963)
(holding on public policy grounds that a release of a hospital’s liability for negligence was
not valid).
22. See Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 306–07 (Mass. 1980)
(“The overall purpose of [the consumer protection law] is that of ‘providing proper
disclosure of information and a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to
persons conducting business activities.’” (quoting Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen., 385
N.E.2d 240, 249 (Mass. 1979))).
23. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.41
(West 2006).
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572q (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 94.676
(West 2012).
25. See Reich, supra note 15, at 34–35.
26. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 12-505 (LexisNexis 2009).
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consumer protection statutes that provide a private right of action when a
consumer is injured.27
While consumer protection laws usually strive to help consumers have
access to good information or to provide remedies when they are harmed,
there are some laws and regulations that remove consumer choices from the
market. When the government steps in to determine the options available to
consumers, “it replaces the decisions of consumers in the marketplace with
government edicts, a method whose premise is fundamentally incompatible
with the liberal assumption that each person is the best judge of his or her
own needs.”28 Thus, there should be strong justifications for prohibiting
consumer options.
Because the legal profession’s monopoly prohibits almost all consumer
options for legal advice and representation other than licensed attorneys,29 it
is useful to examine theories that justify a total ban of some consumer
options, as opposed to warnings, disclaimers, or other informational
requirements.30 One theory is that bans “are thought to be necessary
whenever the risk and magnitude of physical or economic harm thereby
avoided is deemed substantially greater than . . . benefits foregone.”31 But
what justifies the government’s risk-benefit analysis to determine on behalf
of consumers what options should be removed from the marketplace?
When do we let consumers determine their own level of risk aversion or
risk taking and when should the government make those determinations?
One possible answer to this question is that a ban is justified when there
are significant costs to the public that arise in the absence of a ban.32 The
ban of leaded gasoline would be one example.33 No one can buy leaded gas
today for use in on-road vehicles.34 The use of leaded gasoline put
thousands of tons of lead into the air that caused lead poisoning, particularly
in children.35 Another way to think about bans in this category is that they
require collective action to advance both individual and societal interests;
i.e., no individual could chose to remove lead from the air they breathe

27. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a (West 2008).
28. Reich, supra note 15, at 14.
29. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. See infra note 86.
30. See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 45–46.
31. Reich, supra note 15, at 11–12. “The likelihood of consumer harm . . . may be so
great relative to the benefits that . . . a total ban is justified.” Id. at 32.
32. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570, 577–84 (1996) (discussing the need for regulation in the face of externalities causing
environmental harm); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, REGULATION,
Winter 2006–2007, at 34–40, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/
files/regulation/2006/12/v29n4-4.pdf.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006) (regulating forms of air pollutants including lead
compounds).
34. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Takes Final Step in Phaseout of Leaded
Gasoline (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-takes-final-stepphaseout-leaded-gasoline.
35. Id.
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without collective action.36 Government edicts that mandate collective
action are the only way to accomplish these goals. There are some who
argue that this is the only category where the government should be
regulating.37
Another possible justification for regulations that ban options is to
protect individual consumers from harm. This has been called a
“purchasing agent model” where the government is acting paternalistically
on behalf of consumers because “consumers cannot be trusted to make
rational purchases . . . [so the government needs] to protect consumers from
the consequences of their own appetites.”38 A less paternalistic view is that
consumers will misestimate physical or economic risks for a variety of
reasons.39 For example, the Food and Drug Administration is in a better
position than is the average consumer to assess the safety and efficacy of
drugs before they are sold to individuals. It is not that the government does
not trust consumers to make good decisions if all drugs were unregulated;
but instead it is not pragmatically feasible that consumers could understand
the risks and benefits enough to make an informed purchasing decision.
It is difficult, however, to come up with an example of a prohibition that
operates solely to protect individuals and does not have any broader societal
impact.40 In reality, most bans probably serve a hybrid purpose; whether
they are justified depends on how one views their primary purpose. Laws
that prohibit the sale of cars without seatbelts, laws that ban trans fats, and
legal attempts to restrict the size of sodas are all examples that fall
somewhere along the spectrum of this hybrid category.41 On the one hand,
decisions about what risks are acceptable to one’s body and finances are
personal decisions and there is a robust political debate about whether

36. See Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public
Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SUPPLEMENT) 88, 88
(2013) (quoting Dr. Thomas Farley, Health Commissioner for New York City, who stated:
“The reason we have government in the first place is to solve problems collectively that we
can’t solve individually”).
37. See Lambert, supra note 32, at 34–40; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18
(David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859) (“The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.”).
38. Reich, supra note 15, at 19–20. When the government decides who can offer certain
services, it has effectively taken on the role of purchasing agent, “assessing the merits and
demerits of particular products on behalf of consumers.” Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 20. “The point is that it is the ignorance of consumers, rather than the
product’s intrinsic risk, which triggers the inquiry into the need for government action.” Id.
at 25.
40. Many would disagree with this point. Some would say that bans on items such as
trans fats are paternalistic decrees that deprive individuals of choice. While there is room to
debate about when government should intervene, to say that health problems caused by poor
diet have no broader societal costs is simply not correct. See infra notes 44–45 and
accompanying text. But see Lambert, supra note 32, at 34–40.
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114377 (West 2012) (banning the use of trans fats
in food preparation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-136.3 (2013) (prohibiting food containing
trans fats from being made available to students by public schools); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:376.2 (West 2012) (prohibiting the sale of automobiles not equipped with seat belts).
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government regulation is appropriate in these areas.42 On the other hand,
injuries from accidents and health problems related to poor diet can have
significant indirect public costs in the form of increased healthcare
expenditures and impacts on the labor market.43 Unlike the example of
leaded gas, where the risk of breathing polluted air cannot be averted
without collective action, an individual can choose whether to risk the
injuries that could result from not wearing a seatbelt regardless of the laws
in place. An individual cannot, however, choose what the medical costs
will be as a result of those injuries or the impact on the ability to be in the
workforce, so to argue that the consequences of such a personal decision
has no societal impact, albeit indirect, is mistaken.44 The debate about the
appropriateness of the law, therefore, frequently revolves around an
assessment of whether the regulations have a sufficient nexus to the public
interest.45
B. Historical Justifications for the Legal Profession’s Monopoly
There are several possible objectives for regulating the legal profession,46
but regulating the delivery of legal services does not necessarily mean that
only lawyers can deliver legal services. Different types of practitioners
could be regulated too.47 This section, therefore, focuses on the
justifications that are most commonly cited as the basis for limiting the
practice of law to lawyers. First, the legal profession’s monopoly
theoretically protects individuals from the personal consequences of
incompetent legal advice that could include losses to life, liberty, and
property.48 The monopoly also serves a broader public interest in the
integrity of the rule of law and the effective functioning of the judicial
branch of government.49 Our adversarial system of dispute resolution is
usually more effective with trained practitioners, which is why, for
example, there is a right to counsel in criminal cases. In this sense, the

42. See, e.g., In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 97–100 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing individual liberty over personal decisions against the state’s interest in
preserving life).
43. See, e.g., Merav W. Efrat & Rafael Efrat, Tax Policy and the Obesity Epidemic, 25
J.L. & HEALTH 233, 239–44 (2012).
44. But see Wiley et al., supra note 36, at 89 (suggesting that increased healthcare costs
are as much a function of our collective financing of healthcare as it is a function of
increased obesity).
45. See, e.g., id. at 90 (detailing the debate about the “nanny state” versus “personal
responsibility” in the context of legal attempts to restrict the size of soft drinks).
46. Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734 (proposing a list of regulatory objectives for the
legal profession).
47. See John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for the
Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 537–38
(describing the liberalized delivery of legal services under the United Kingdom’s 2007 Legal
Services Act).
48. I say “theoretically” because this assumes that everyone has access to a lawyer and a
substantial portion of the population does not have access.
49. See, e.g., Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734 (proposing a list of regulatory
objectives for the legal profession).
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regulation of the legal profession is unique when compared to the regulation
of other professions—no other profession is integral to a branch of
government.50 The monopoly protects the financial interests of lawyers by
limiting competition. This section briefly examines each of the theoretical
justifications for the legal profession’s monopoly.
1. Protecting Consumers
One key justification for the legal profession’s monopoly is to protect
consumers from the adverse consequences to their personal and financial
interests that could result from bad legal advice.51 Simply protecting
consumers from such losses, however, is not necessarily a sufficient
justification. The law routinely allows consumers to assume the risk of all
sorts of physical and economic losses, many of which are catastrophic.52
Why can a consumer assume the risk of great physical injury by going on a
challenging private ski course, but not assume the risk of hiring an
unlicensed paralegal to draft a divorce petition? The difference is the
assumption that a consumer can become sufficiently educated to make an
informed choice about the former, but not about the latter. This is not
purely paternalistic in the sense that government does not trust consumers,
but instead comes from a belief that consumers cannot be given enough
information to adequately assess the quality of professional services and
make an informed assessment of risk.53 Only other professionals can assess
whether their peers are qualified to provide the services.54 By requiring
education, an exam, and licensing, the regulatory system ensures some
minimum level of qualifications for those authorized to practice law.55
In other words, the monopoly exists primarily to correct what has been
called “internal market failures,” which are defined as limitations inside the
mind of the consumer that impede the consumer’s ability to make a
reasoned selection among a variety of options.56 The state regulatory
system, by insuring a minimal level of competency through licensing,

50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013).
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2000). Economists refer to
goods as “credence goods,” when it is an expert who determines the buyer’s needs. Id. at
968–69. This same rationale applies to other regulated professions, such as physicians. See
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management,
or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 827 (1995) (stating that physician licensing is justified
because consumers cannot assess the quality of physicians so they must rely on licenses
issued by competent authorities).
54. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 53, at 983 (“In all these [U.S.] jurisdictions, the bar
examination is set and graded by the bar.”).
55. Whether the standards are sufficient to protect consumers may be open to debate.
Many legal employers have lamented that law school graduates are not “practice ready,” and
that they require substantial on-the-job training to become proficient enough to provide
competent legal representation. See, e.g., id. at 985 (“A law degree, by itself, leaves a lawyer
poorly equipped to do very much in the real world of client representation.”).
56. Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 49.
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operates to protect the consumer from the consequences of making bad
choices in the market.57
Whether consumers are truly incapable of making assessments about the
quality of professional services in all situations is worth reexamining. The
internet has provided consumers with increasing access to information
about the law and to information about the quality of services provided.58
Furthermore, an increasing number of consumers have been making the
choice to use services, such as LegalZoom, to meet some of their legal
needs instead of hiring a lawyer. There is little evidence of significant
consumer harm arising from these choices.59
2. Advancing the Integrity of the Judicial System and the Rule of Law
A key rationale for the legal profession’s monopoly is not only to protect
individuals, but also to advance a broader societal goal of maintaining the
public’s confidence in the rule of law and the judicial branch of
government.60 Having unqualified legal practitioners in the courts, for
example, could have a deleterious impact on the functioning of the judicial
system. In the late 1800s, an early advocate for the institution of uniform
statewide bar examinations argued: “Unfit and unworthy men have been
admitted. The time of the courts has been uselessly consumed. Progress
has been impeded. Litigation has increased and justice has been delayed.”61
Another lawyer in the 1920s stated the following regarding the need to curb
the unauthorized practice of law:
The layman, a natural person or corporate, may only compete with the
lawyer in the practice of the law and the doing of law business by orally
soliciting or advertising to do it more expeditiously, faithfully,
intelligently, and at less expense than the lawyer, thereby imputing to the
lawyer slothfulness, infidelity, and extortion. A loss of confidence in the
courts and lawyers is a sign of governmental decline, and a forerunner of
disintegration and anarchy.62

57. See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and
Social Welfare, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 549 (2010) (“Most . . . traditional regulatory attempts
to change behavior aim to ‘insulate’ people from making injurious choices by restricting the
choices available for them to make.”).
58. See Knake, supra note 12, at 1291–96.
59. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the
Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2605–
06 (2014).
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013) (“The legal profession
is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship
between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement.”).
61. HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 85 (1974).
62. SPECIAL COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF BAR ASS’N DELEGATES, ON WHAT
CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF THE LAW AND WHAT CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL AND IMPROPER
PRACTICE OF THE LAW BY LAYMEN OR LAY AGENCIES (1919), reprinted in 44 N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING HELD AT NEW YORK,
JANUARY 21–22, 1921 AND CHARTER, CONSTITUTION, BY-LAWS, LISTS OF MEMBERS,
OFFICERS, COMMITTEES AND REPORTS FOR 1920 app. A at 302–03 (1921) (emphasis added).
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Having competently trained legal practitioners in the courts, therefore, is
important to a society whose identity is based largely on the rule of law and
the integrity of its judicial system.63
This rationale is certainly a noble one, but it is undercut by a couple of
realities on the ground. First, the public’s perception of the rule of law and
equal justice is harmed when much of the public lacks meaningful access to
legal representation in the courts.64 The public tends to view lawyers as
hired guns for the wealthy as opposed to affordable advocates for the
average citizen.65 This perception is harmful to the integrity of the courts
and the judicial branch.
Second, lawyers perform different types of work in many different
settings: advocacy work in the trial and appellate courts, advocacy work in
other types of tribunals such as arbitrations and administrative proceedings,
transactional work, and consulting on regulatory compliance, to name some
examples. Not all of these settings implicate the integrity of the judicial
branch to the same degree, so the strength of this justification is not
necessarily the same across the spectrum of legal services.
3. Economic Protectionism
Another possible rationale for the monopoly that needs to be addressed is
economic protectionism. Under this rationale, the state has effectively
given lawyers a franchise and, therefore, lawyers have a property interest in
their law licenses.66 Prohibiting competition from unlicensed practitioners
protects that property interest in part by keeping lawyers’ fees high.67 This
rationale is not commonly articulated in support of maintaining the
monopoly because self-protectionism is not a particularly noble endeavor
and does not curry favor with the public, but it is an ever-present

63. See supra note 60.
64. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 26 (“To the extent that litigants are
proceeding without counsel because they cannot afford an attorney, and the outcome of their
case is being compromised by lack of representation, equal justice is at risk.”). The disparity
of resources between prosecutors and public defenders also does little to advance the
public’s sense of fairness and equality in the justice system. See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner,
The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 271 (2009).
65. See Russell Pearce, The Legal Profession As a Blue State: Reflections on Public
Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1358–62 (2006)
(discussing the shift to the hired gun paradigm); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of
Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 185
(2004) (discussing the public’s perception that the average citizens view tax lawyers as hired
guns who help the wealthy find loopholes).
66. See Richard F. Mallen & Assocs., Ltd. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74,
76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that a personal injury law firm had standing to sue a business
allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law “[b]ecause the practice of law by an
entity not licensed constitutes an infringement upon the rights of those who are properly
licensed”).
67. See Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215, 216 (1992)
(tracing the principle that “[h]igh wages in a profession are necessary to compensate an
entrant when great expenses must be incurred from learning its trade” back to Adam Smith).
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undercurrent—perhaps even more so today with large numbers of lawyers
unemployed.68
The legal profession has faced accusations of economic protectionism
since it focused on curbing the unauthorized practice of law following the
Great Depression, but it has always denied this motive. For example, a
1931 American Bar Association (ABA) committee wrote: “The practice of
law by unauthorized persons is an evil because it endangers the personal
and property rights of the public and interferes with the proper
administration of justice. It is not an evil because it takes away business
from lawyers.”69 The same theme still comes up today. The Washington
Supreme Court recently adopted a rule to create limited license legal
technicians (LLLTs) to focus on providing legal assistance in the area of
family law.70 The Washington State Bar Association’s Board of Governors
objected to the proposed rule and argued, among other points, that “the
legal technician program will take work away from young, rural, and less
affluent lawyers.”71 The Washington Supreme Court rejected this as a
reason not to adopt the proposed rule and wrote:
[T]he basis of any regulatory scheme, including our exercise of the
exclusive authority to determine who can practice law in this state and
under what circumstances, must start and end with the public interest; and
any regulatory scheme must be designed to ensure that those who provide
legal and law related services have the education, knowledge, skills and
abilities to do so. Protecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any
practice area is not a legitimate objective.72

Following the conclusion of the Washington Supreme Court and others,73
this Article assumes that economic protectionism is not a proper
justification for the monopoly.

68. See Reich, supra note 15, at 5 (“The murky origins of consumer protection are thus
intimately bound up with protection of certain businesses from competition.”).
69. Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 56 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 477 (1931); see also Rhode, supra note 6, at 220.
70. Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice
Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75 (2013).
71. Id. at 106.
72. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, slip op. at 7 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf
(emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., State v. Pledger, 127 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1962) (stating that
unauthorized practice of law statutes were “not enacted for the purpose of conferring upon
the legal profession an absolute monopoly in the preparation of legal documents; its purpose
is for the better security of the people against incompetency and dishonesty in an area of
activity affecting general welfare”).
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II. THE MONOPOLY’S RESTRICTIONS ON MARKET OPTIONS AND THE
RELATED IMPACT ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
Having looked at some of the benefits of giving lawyers a monopoly over
certain work, this Part examines some of the costs. If the legal profession
were not a government-regulated monopoly, it would be subject to the full
force of state and federal consumer protection and antitrust laws.74 Instead,
the profession has been largely policing itself with respect to traditional
consumer protection issues—i.e., protecting consumers from deceptive
The profession has not,
practices, unfair billing, and the like.75
understandably, concerned itself with issues that would fall in the antitrust
area of what can be considered “external market failures”—meaning
anticompetitive limits on the menu of options.76 A monopoly, by its very
definition, is obviously limiting the market. But do the concerns about
consumers’ limited ability to evaluate the quality of professional services
justify abandoning concerns about the menu of options available? To
answer this question, this Part briefly looks at how the monopoly’s effect on
the external market—the menu of options—negatively impacts consumers,
focusing on the interrelated issues of cost, access, and innovation.
A. The Limits on Competition Drive Up Costs
Any monopoly can drive up prices—this is one of the main rationales for
antitrust laws.77 Scholars previously have argued that the legal profession’s
monopoly also increases the cost of legal services to consumers. For
example, Professor Hadfield wrote: “The concept of a profession may set
the practice apart as a normative ideal, but the structuring of the [legal]
profession is still the structuring of a market.”78 She argues that the current
structure has resulted in a bidding competition for scarce resources that has
been dominated by those with the most money—corporations and wealthy
individuals.79 This, in turn, has driven up the cost of legal services because

74. This is not to suggest that the profession is completely immune to antitrust laws. It
is not. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (“[C]ertain
anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act.”); Rhode, supra
note 6, at 217–18.
75. See, e.g., Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 107 (Ill. 1998) (holding that the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act was not intended to “regulate the conduct of attorneys in representing
clients” and, therefore, allegedly fraudulent billing practices were exempt from the Act).
76. Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 50–51 (describing external market failures).
77. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”).
78. Hadfield, supra note 53, at 956.
79. Id. Professor Hadfield further explained:
The distribution of legal services produced by the market for lawyers is thus quite
disturbing: organized as a self-regulating profession with guardianship of the
public justice system, a system that lies at the heart of democratic social structure,
the profession is propelled by market forces to devote itself disproportionately to
the management of the economic relationships of commerce and not the
management of just relations among individuals and the state.
Id. at 956–57.
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the cost is not based on the services provided; instead, it is based on the
value that the wealthiest consumers place on the services.80
The monopoly’s restriction on the involvement of nonlawyers also
shields lawyers from price competition from other players in the market,
which can also drive up costs. For example, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has frequently cautioned bar associations not to restrict nonlawyers
from handling real estate closings because everyone—even consumers who
choose to hire a lawyer—pay less when nonlawyers are also allowed to
handle real estate closings. The FTC provided some empirical evidence for
this position when it wrote to the Ethics Committee of the North Carolina
State Bar:
In 1995, after a 16-day evidentiary hearing conducted by a special master,
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected an opinion eliminating lay
closings. The Court found that real estate closing fees were much lower
in southern New Jersey, where lay settlements were commonplace, than in
the northern part of the state, where lawyers conducted almost all
settlements. This was true even for consumers who chose attorney
closings. South Jersey buyers represented by counsel throughout the
entire transaction, including closing, paid $650 on average, while sellers
paid $350. North Jersey buyers represented by counsel paid an average of
$1,000, and sellers paid an average of $750.81

Some argue that a monopoly’s high fees are just one side of a social
contract that is of mutual benefit to both the profession and consumers. As
one author wrote about the history of the growth of occupational licensing
statutes:
Although intended to protect from competition certain industries and
occupations—interests which were able to mobilize political support for
entry restrictions far more easily than consumers could have mobilized
against them—the advantages that accrued to consumers from these
measures support a theory of mutual benefit. Consumers in effect
accepted higher prices in exchange for security against marginal
operators, who might otherwise have taken advantage of rapid changes to
defraud or endanger them.82

There may be some truth to this mutual benefit theory. As compared to
other restrictions on choice, such as dietary restrictions, the public has not
been as hostile to restrictions on choice that derive from professional
licensing.83 This suggests that the public sees some value in licensing. The
80. Id. at 956.
81. Letter from Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n to N.C. State Bar Ethics
Comm. (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V020006.shtm (emphasis
added); see also Letter from the Staff of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Office of Policy Planning,
Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Econ. to Carl E. Testo, Counsel for the Rules Comm.
of the Superior Court of Conn. (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
V070006.pdf (expressing concerns that a proposed rule to define the practice of law would
be interpreted in an overly broad manner and would have a negative impact on consumers
and competition).
82. Reich, supra note 15, at 8 (emphasis added).
83. See Wiley et al., supra note 36, at 89.
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public’s discontent with lawyers is, however, mainly focused on cost.84
Given the high cost of lawyers, this mutual benefit theory has broken down
for the vast majority who simply cannot afford to pay the current cost of
security against marginal operators.85
B. The Limits on Competition Restrict Access to Legal Services
With few exceptions, the current scope of the legal profession’s
monopoly limits consumers’ options for legal services to those provided by
licensed attorneys.86 As discussed, this is justified on the basis that the
government must regulate options for consumers who cannot assess the
risks and benefits of services in an unregulated market. This premise,
however, presupposes that every consumer has the resources to hire a
lawyer or will otherwise be able to obtain a lawyer. If the consumer does
not have such access—and many of them do not—then there really is no
choice other than to proceed pro se. Consumer protection is not advanced
when there is a group of highly trained lawyers that large segments of the
population cannot access.87 Under this scenario, much of the public is left
wandering around the self-help section of bookstores and self-help kiosks in
courthouses trying to figure out how to handle matters on their own.88 If
they cannot become informed enough to decide to hire a paralegal versus an
attorney, how are they supposed to become informed enough to handle
legal matters on their own?
The legal profession has recognized this problem, but it has almost
exclusively focused on increasing pro bono and legal aid services as the
remedy for this failure in access.89 In other words, the legal profession has
historically focused on increasing access to lawyers, as opposed to
exploring innovative alternatives, as the main solution.90 This approach is
84. See, e.g., Paul F. Teich, Are Lawyers Truly Greedy? An Analysis of Relevant
Empirical Evidence, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 837, 847–48 (2013) (summarizing polls
regarding the public’s perception of lawyers’ greed and the cost of legal services).
85. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1–2 (“[T]he vast majority of people who
appear without representation do so because they are unable to afford an attorney.”).
86. See Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a
Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79, 114–22 (2012) (discussing limited exceptions for
form preparation assistance and representation in administrative proceedings).
87. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 25 (reporting data collected throughout the
states in 2006, which found that a large percentage of litigants are unrepresented).
88. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 12
(2012), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_
FINAL.pdf (noting that in 2011, over 65,000 people in Chicago, “all of whom who were
already in court and in desperate need of assistance,” used various help desks located within
Cook County).
89. Id. at 18 (“Pro bono lawyers are a great potential resource for reducing demand for
legal services.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 413, 425 (2003) (“During the mid-twentieth century, the bar sought to encourage
greater pro bono involvement. Part of the motivation was to prevent the government from
responding to pervasive unmet needs by loosening the rules against practice by
nonlawyers . . . .”).
90. See, e.g., Susan Hayes Stephan, Blowing the Whistle on Justice As Sport: 100 Years
of Playing a Non-zero Sum Game, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 613–14 (2007).
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not working. Study after study has concluded that every year millions of
Americans are handling their legal matters without any legal assistance, and
the problem is getting worse.91
Despite the growing unmet need for legal assistance, many law school
graduates are having trouble finding work, causing many to conclude that
there are too many lawyers.92 There are, however, only too many lawyers
if the demand is defined as those who can afford to pay lawyers’ going
rates. There are not too many lawyers if demand is defined as those who
need legal assistance.93 The monopoly’s cost structure has created a great
disconnect in the market between supply and demand that is preventing the
public from accessing legal services.
C. The Limits on Competition Stifle Innovation
An industry that enjoys a monopoly has little incentive to innovate in
ways that could reduce the cost of services.94 As a self-regulated
monopoly, the legal profession has had little incentive to innovate thus far.
For almost the past 100 years, the education and licensing of lawyers and
the delivery of legal services has looked about the same—lawyers attend
three years of law school, they take a bar exam, they receive their license
from a state supreme court, and they are the only ones authorized to provide
legal services. This is not necessarily surprising. As Professor Christensen
has written, disruptive innovations frequently originate outside of
incumbent organizations.95
What is unique about the legal profession, as compared to other
professions, is that it enjoys substantial immunity from outsiders who want
to challenge the monopoly’s status quo because, under the separation of
powers doctrine, the state judicial branches regulate the practice of law.96
Unlike other professions, such as the medical profession, there is no
legislative process for outsiders to lobby and seek changes to the scope of
the legal profession’s monopoly to allow for innovation.97 With rare
exception, legislatures cannot authorize nonlawyers to engage in acts that
are considered the practice of law, so any changes to the scope of the legal
profession’s monopoly must come from the state supreme courts and their
rulemaking processes or from challenges in the marketplace.98 Both of

91. See e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1–2.
92. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Barely Half of All 2012 Law Grads Have Long-Term, FullTime Legal Jobs, Data Shows, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/barely_half_of_all_2012_law_grads_have_long-term_full_time_legal_jobs_data_/.
93. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 5, at 1 (“[O]nly a small fraction of the legal
problems experienced by low-income people (less than one in five) are addressed with the
assistance of either a private attorney (pro bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer.”).
94. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 17, at 46–47.
95. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY
BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS (First Harper Bus. Paperback ed.
2011); see also Campbell, supra note 10, at 7–12.
96. See Rigertas, supra note 86, at 111.
97. See id. at 111–13.
98. See id. at 111–26.
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these are occurring, but most changes are occurring by challenges in the
marketplace.99 Challenges from the marketplace, however, can be risky
business propositions in the absence of clear authorization from the state
supreme courts. If a new business model is challenging the status quo, it
may face a lawsuit charging the unauthorized practice of law. The survival
of the business—and value of the investment in it—could then turn on the
outcome of that lawsuit. Challenges from the marketplace also put the state
supreme courts in the position of leading from behind instead of being in
the forefront of thinking about ways to increase access.
III. REASSESSING THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY
The future sustainability of the legal profession’s monopoly will require
state supreme courts to be more proactive in assessing ways to increase
access and to reexamine the boundaries of lawyers’ exclusive practice
areas. As an initial matter, it may be helpful for them to set out an explicit
analytical framework to assess the type of services that lawyers provide in
light of the types of justifications for limiting consumer options. It may be
helpful as an initial matter to conceptualize the framework as a table to
examine areas where alternative approaches may be viable. Here is a
simplistic start that could be further developed:

This Article argues that the justifications for the monopoly are the
strongest in the first column and then, as a whole, get progressively weaker
as indicated by the color shading.100 Therefore, the strength of the
justifications for limiting legal service providers to only licensed attorneys
does not have the same force across the entire spectrum of work that
lawyers do. And, in fact, what is pragmatically happening across the
country in terms of nonlawyer activity also supports this conclusion.101 The

99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100. These rationales for government regulation can be expanded into a more nuanced
list, but this Article is focusing on these two key areas. For a more detailed list of possible
regulatory objectives, see Terry et al., supra note 14, at 2734–42.
101. See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 10, at 3001; Barton, supra note 13, at 3084–85.

2014]

FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS

2699

remainder of this Part briefly looks at the two ends of the spectrum on this
table to explore how this framework can help inform future regulations.
Based on this preliminary table, the strictest limits on who can practice
law have the strongest justifications when the work involves the courts, as
reflected in the first column. In that column, there are valid consumer
protection concerns and valid concerns about the integrity and functioning
of the judicial branch, so there is a strong case to be made for some
regulation of legal services. The relative strength of the justification does
not necessarily mean that only lawyers should perform those services.
Under the current structure, the lack of access to legal assistance by those
who can afford such services undermines the consumer protection concerns.
Therefore, more state supreme courts should consider alternative types of
regulation. Much like the delivery of healthcare services, there are potential
benefits in stratifying the legal profession to train and regulate professionals
with different types of legal training.102
Three states—Washington, California, and New York—are all currently
examining the role that nonlawyers can play in the delivery of legal
services. This suggests some growing recognition that a licensed attorney
may not be needed for every legal issue.103 In June 2012, the Washington
Supreme Court enacted the most expansive model to date—a Limited
Practice Rule for LLLTs.104 The rule creates a framework for the licensing
and regulation of nonlawyers, who will be authorized to independently
perform discrete tasks that clearly are the practice of law.105 The
Washington Supreme Court explained that the rule was necessary because
the legal profession’s efforts to close the access to justice gap have not
successfully stopped the growth of low- and moderate-income citizens who
have no access to affordable legal assistance.106 In March 2013, the
Washington Supreme Court approved family law as the first practice
area.107 One of the benefits of this approach is that the LLLTs owe

102. See Rigertas, supra note 86, at 118–22.
103. Consistent with this idea, several states and federal agencies have authorized
nonlawyers to appear in a representative capacity in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (permitting federal agencies to determine whether nonlawyers may
appear in administrative proceedings in a representative capacity); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/806 (2014) (authorizing nonlawyers to represent claimants before the Illinois
Department of Employment Security); 26 C.F.R. § 601.502 (2014) (permitting certain
nonlawyers to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 511.71–.73 (2013) (permitting nonlawyers to represent parties before the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
104. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28. For an in-depth analysis of this rule and the
history of its enactment, see generally Holland, supra note 70.
105. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-1-1005, slip op. at 2 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf.
106. Id. at 4–6.
107. Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT), WASH. ST. B. ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-Technicians/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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professional duties to their clients similar to those of an attorney, which
includes important protections such as the attorney-client privilege.108
California and New York are in earlier stages of exploring the role of
nonlawyers. In March 2013, the State Bar of California’s Board of Trustees
created a Limited License Working Group to explore the creation of a
limited practice license.109 The working group has had several public
meetings and has recommended further study of a limited license program
as a way to increase access to legal services.110 In New York, Chief Judge
Jonathan Lippman formed the Committee on Non-Lawyers and the Justice
Gap in early 2013 to study the use of nonlawyers to provide some
assistance in simple legal matters. That committee was expected to make
recommendations for a pilot program to focus in the areas of housing, elder
law, and consumer credit before the end of 2013.111 All of this suggests a
growing recognition that more options can be made available to consumers
without creating intolerable risk. It is possible, however, that none of these
options go far enough. The tasks authorized so far are really quite
constrained and they may just be the first step necessary to develop
expanded options. State supreme courts should robustly explore these
options.
Returning to the table, as one moves to the fourth column, consumer
protection concerns still exist, but the concern about the integrity and
functioning of the judicial branch decreases. Therefore, the state supreme
courts should consider alternative regulations, or perhaps even deregulation
of some services in these areas. Deregulation of some legal services would
reduce the costs of services through increased options and competition, but
it would increase the risk to consumers of incompetent services.
Consumers would have little assurance of the quality of services they were
purchasing other than those assurances provided by the marketplace.
Instead of protecting consumers at the point of purchase, consumer
protection would largely depend on postinjury remedies that would likely
arise from lawsuits for breach of contract, consumer fraud, or deceptive
These remedies could be insufficient because
trade practices.112
questionable operators may not have adequate assets to pay judgments.113
Furthermore, consumers would not have any of the protections that arise
from professional duties, such as the duty of confidentiality and the duty of

108. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(k).
109. For links to the Working Group’s agendas and news, see Limited License Working
Group, ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/BoardofTrustees/LimitedLicense
WorkingGroup.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
110. Laura Ernde, Panel Gives Nod to Limited License Idea, CAL. B.J. (July 2013),
http://www.calbarjournal.com/July2013/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx.
111. Joel Stashenko, Non-lawyers May Be Given Role in Closing ‘Justice Gap,’ N.Y.
L.J., May 29, 2013, at 1.
112. Instead of complete deregulation, there could be limited regulation that mandated
certain disclaimers and information to help consumers assess the risk of the services being
purchased.
113. Publicly funded victim compensation funds could provide an alternative source of
recovery if the profession was deregulated.
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loyalty. These concerns support a conclusion that deregulation is not as
attractive an option as a broad remedy for increasing options. In effect, this
approach would completely swing the pendulum so that the consumers
would have little protection from internal market failures in order to remedy
external market failures. However, deregulation may be appropriate in
some limited areas.
There are a growing number of examples of consumers exercising the
limited choices available to them with little evidence of consumer harm.114
Some of these areas are unregulated. As mentioned, many consumers have
paid money for do-it-yourself assistance from companies like Nolo Press
and LegalZoom.115 Many companies hire consulting firms that may or may
not have lawyers on staff to provide advice about a wide range of regulatory
compliance.116 The state supreme courts should consider amending the
formal rules that are, in many respects, inconsistent with what is actually
occurring in the market. Furthermore, other countries, such as the United
Kingdom, are experimenting with alternative structures to deliver legal
services, which are providing additional data that some alternative models
can exist without undue harm to consumers.117 This area warrants further
exploration.
CONCLUSION
At the heart of the suggestions for deregulation and stratification are a
couple of assumptions. First, there is an assumption that reducing the costs
of entry to the profession and increasing competition will make legal
services of an adequate quality more affordable to a broader segment of the
population. Second, there is an assumption that without a three-year juris
doctor, a person could still be trained to competently handle some legal
matters. Both of these assumptions warrant more study, but it is likely that
getting reliable data on these assumptions will not be possible until more
states experiment and implement alternatives that can be assessed. When
the Washington Supreme Court created LLLTs, it responded to criticism
that the economics of the proposal were unknown:

114. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1981).
Only 39 percent of jurisdictions surveyed reported any direct customer complaints, and out
of the 1,188 inquiries, investigations, and complaints reported by bar agencies, only 2
percent were a form of customer complaint about a specific customer injury. Id. at 33; see
also Thomas D. Zilavy & Andrew J. Chevrez, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:
Court Tells Profession, Show Us the Harm, 78 WIS. LAW. 8 (2005), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=78
&Issue=10&ArticleID=994 (discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s denial of the state
bar’s petition to provide a clear definition of the unauthorized practice of law because the bar
did not provide any evidence that that a problem exists).
115. See Garon, supra note 11, at 1174–77.
116. See Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1364–74 (2000).
117. See generally Flood, supra note 47.
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No one has a crystal ball. It may be that stand-alone limited license legal
technicians will not find the practice lucrative and that the cost of
establishing and maintaining a practice under this rule will require them to
charge rates close to those of attorneys. On the other hand, it may be that
economies can be achieved that will allow these very limited services to
be offered at a market rate substantially below those of attorneys. There
is simply no way to know the answer to this question without trying it.118

It is also worth noting that deregulation and stratification will not fill the
entire gap. There is still a segment of the population that cannot afford to
pay anything for legal services. For that group, legal aid and pro bono will
continue to be vital. However, legal aid and pro bono are never going to be
able to close the entire gap.119 For those who can pay something for legal
services, but not the going rates, more options need to be available.
There are several issues in legal education that make exploring the
training of different types of professionals particularly timely. First, there
has been a consistent decline in law school applications over the past
several years that has left most law schools with excess capacity.120 There
have been predictions that some schools will close.121 Given the number of
unmet legal needs, however, this would be an unfortunate outcome.
Second, there has been a call from the legal profession for law schools to
produce graduates who are “practice ready.”122 Third, there has been
discussion and concern about the rising cost of legal education.123 Many
who address the issue of cost suggest reducing the number of credits to
obtain a law degree.124
If the state supreme courts are willing to reexamine who can practice law,
it may also be a good opportunity to examine how legal education should be
retooled. What if schools could offer the traditional three-year juris doctor
program that would allow someone to practice in all areas, as is the case
today, but also offer several specialty degrees that would only require
twelve or eighteen months of study and lead to a limited license in that
practice area? For example, could a law school—working with the existing
curriculum—craft a two- or three-semester curriculum in an area such as
housing law that would prepare a graduate to fully represent clients in
landlord-tenant disputes, evictions, foreclosures, and real estate closings?
Could states go beyond what Washington State has done, which does not
allow the LLLTs to appear in court, and let law schools create a two- or

118. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-1-1005, slip op. at 8–9 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf.
119. Rigertas, supra note 86, at 90–94.
120. Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall As Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A1.
121. Id.
122. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2011, at A1.
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three-semester curriculum that would lead to a limited license in family law
that would allow a practitioner to fully represent clients in divorce and
custody proceedings? If these subject-specific licenses included a semester
of field practice or apprenticeship prior to being licensed, would these
practitioners be closer to being practice ready? In a world of increasingly
specialized practice, does everyone who is authorized to practice law need a
general legal education? If the external market—the menu of options
available—is an important aspect of consumer protection, then the state
supreme courts should explore all of these questions.

